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Variations in O®er Arrival Rates in a
Stationary Search Model: A Note.
Padma Rao Sahib*
SOM-theme D Regional Science
Abstract: The standard search model predicts that the hazard and the ex-
pected accepted wage should be constant over an unemployment spell. This
note shows that heterogeneity in job o®er arrival rates can generate declining
hazards and declining accepted wages, results in conformity with the empir-
ical evidence. In addition, two testable implications are derived. The ¯rst is
a relationship between the rate of change of the aggregate hazard over time
and the variance of the hazard; and the second between the rate of change
over time of the expected accepted wage and the covariance between the ex-
pected accepted wage and the hazard.
Keywords: stationary search model, o®er arrival rate, heterogeneity.
JEL classi¯cation: D83; J64;
* This paper has bene¯tted from discussions with Ken Burdett, Bryan Camp-
bell, Gordon Fisher and Nick Kiefer. This version: May 2001.
1 Introduction
The majority of empirical search studies ¯nd that the hazard from unemploy-
ment and average accepted wages both decline with unemployment spell length
(see Devine and Kiefer 1991 for a survey). This ¯nding is in con°ict with the
standard search model which predicts that both accepted wages and the haz-
ard should be unrelated to unemployment duration (see, e.g., Mortensen 1986
for an exposition of the job search model). The introduction of heterogeneity
into the reservation wages of workers (which can arise due to di®erences in
discount rates or search costs), other factors such as the o®er arrival rate and
the wage distribution kept unchanged, solves only part of the problem. This
approach generates a declining hazard from unemployment but also generates
an expected accepted wage which increases with unemployment duration. In
this context, workers with higher reservation wages reject a larger fraction of
o®ered wages, and become employed at a slower rate than workers with lower
reservation wages.
The theoretical literature has turned to non-stationary models to explain
this observation. Non-stationary models, i.e. models in which factors in the
worker's environment are allowed to change over the length of an unemploy-
ment spell, can generate declining hazards and declining accepted wages. Ex-
amples of non-stationarity in search models include features such as unem-
ployment bene¯ts that decline over time, workers who learn about the wage
distribution over time and unemployment spells that have a \scar" e®ect (see,
e.g., Borjas and Heckman 1980; Mortensen 1986; Burdett and Vishwanath
1988). While non-stationarity is certainly a feature of the environment faced
by an unemployed worker, other factors may also be important in explaining
the empirical observation of declining hazards and declining accepted wages.
For instance, many empirical studies have found that variations in o®er ar-
rival rates across individuals are an important determinant of variations in
the patterns of unemployment (see, e.g., Devine and Kiefer 1991).
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This note shows that the broad empirical regularity of declining hazards
and declining accepted wages can be accommodated within the framework of
a stationary model by allowing job o®er arrival rates to vary across other-
wise homogeneous workers. The aggregate hazard and the aggregate expected
accepted wage are both shown to decline over time. In addition, this model
yields two testable implications. First, an equivalence between the rate of
change over time of the aggregate hazard and the variance of the aggregate
hazard is obtained. Second, a relationship between the rate of change over
time of the aggregate expected accepted wage and the covariance between the
aggregate hazard and the aggregate expected accepted wage is derived.
2 A Standard Search Model
Consider a search model in which an in¯nitely-lived unemployed worker seeks
to maximize the expected present discounted value of lifetime income. Time is
assumed to be continuous and job o®ers arrive according to a Poisson process
with parameter ¸. Each job o®er is a wage w; taken to be a random draw
from a wage o®er distribution F (w) with supremum z. While unemployed,
the worker receives bene¯ts denoted bdt during time period dt and discounts
the future at rate r. Given the stationary environment, the expected present
value of unemployment is constant throughout the spell of unemployment,
while the expected present value of employment is increasing in the accepted
wage. The optimal strategy for a worker is to accept a wage o®er only if it
exceeds a certain cut-o® wage, called the reservation wage. For notational
ease, the reservation wage will be denoted by R(¸); although it is clear that







[w ¡R(¸)] dF (w):
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The expected accepted wage, W (¸) is simply E(wjw ¸ R(¸)). It can be
demonstrated (Mortensen, 1986), that an increase in the o®er arrival rate
makes workers more discriminating and increases both the reservation wage
and the expected accepted wage; i.e. R0(¸) > 0 and W 0(¸) > 0:
The worker leaves unemployment if a job o®er exceeds R(¸). Therefore, the
hazard from unemployment, denoted q(¸); is ¸ [1 ¡ F (R(¸))]. The e®ect of an
increase in the job o®er arrival rate on the hazard is more complicated, because
an increase in ¸ has a direct positive e®ect and an indirect negative e®ect.
The second e®ect arises as an increase in ¸ increases R(¸) which decreases the
probability that an o®ered wage is accepted. The assumption that F 0(w) is
log-concave is su±cient to guarantee that q0(¸) ¸ 0 (see Van den Berg 1994
for equivalent conditions under which an increase in the job o®er arrival rate
yields an increase in the hazard).
3 Heterogeneity in Job O®er Arrival Rates
Let there beK groups of workers who are observationally identical except that
they receive job o®ers at di®erent rates1. Only unemployment spell lengths
and accepted wages are observed by the econometrician who does not know to
which group a worker belongs to. All groups of workers become unemployed at
time 0. Group i receive o®ers at rate ¸i, i = 1; 2; :::K and ¸1 > ¸2 > :::: > ¸K .
It is assumed that F 0(w), the wage o®er density faced by all workers, is log-
concave. For group i; the reservation wage, the expected accepted wage and
the hazard from unemployment are R(¸i); W (¸i) and q(¸i) respectively.
Since the groups have di®erent arrival rates and therefore exit unemploy-
1Situations in which the wage o®er distribution faced by workers is the same but the
job o®er arrival rates they face are di®erent may arise in labour markets where wages are
attached to jobs. In such cases, employers have discretion only over the job o®ers they can
make. Anti-discrimination laws may prevent employers from o®ering lower wages to some
workers, but they can choose not to make job o®ers to workers they do not favour.
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ment at di®erent rates, the number of workers belonging to any group i in
the unemployed pool changes over time2. This is in contrast to the standard
search model in which all workers receive o®ers at the same rate ¸. Conse-
quently, in the standard search case, all workers have the same hazard, q(¸),
and the same expected accepted wage, W (¸):
When there is heterogeneity in the o®er arrival rate, ¸ can be treated as a
discrete random variable that takes on the value ¸i; i = 1; 2:::K: Interpreting ¸
as a random variable implies that the reservation wage, the expected accepted
wage and the hazard are also random variables since they are functions of ¸:
Let ni(t) be the number of workers of group i who are unemployed at




Therefore, the proportion of group i workers who are unemployed at time t is
¯i(t) = ni(t)=n(t). Notice that ¯i(t) can also be interpreted as the probability
that a worker, drawn randomly from all workers unemployed at time t, belongs
to group i: The hazard of workers who are unemployed at time t is a random
variable which takes on the value q(¸i) with probability ¯i(t). The mean of





¹q(t) can also be interpreted as the aggregate hazard from unemployment at
time t. The variance of the hazard at time t is
KX
i=1




¯i(t) [q(¸i) ¡ ¹q(t)] q(¸i): (2)
Attention is now turned to workers who become employed at time t. The
probability that a worker, drawn randomly from all workers who become em-
2The empirical implications of the model when there are two groups of workers is explored
in Rao Sahib (1998).
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ployed at time t, belongs to group i is ¯i(t)q(¸i)= q(t). Therefore, the hazard of
workers who become employed at time t; is a random variable which takes on
the value q(¸i) with probability ¯i(t)q(¸i)= q(t). The mean of the distribution









Notice that ~q(t) can also be interpreted as the aggregate hazard of workers
who exit unemployment at time t. Similarly, the expected accepted wage for
workers who exit unemployment at time t is a random variable which takes on
the valueW (¸i) with probability ¯i(t)q(¸i)=q(t). The mean of the distribution









W (t) can also be interpreted as the aggregate expected accepted wage for
workers who exit unemployment at time t:
Since q0(¸) > 0 and W 0(¸) > 0; workers who belong to groups with higher
¸'s leave unemployment sooner and have higher accepted wages than workers
from groups with lower ¸'s. Therefore, the covariance between the hazard of
the workers who exit unemployment at time t and the expected accepted wage
at time t is positive. This is a covariance in an unusual sense, because both the
hazard and the expected accepted wage are functions of the same underlying







W (¸i) ¡W (t)
´








W (¸i) ¡W (t)
´
q(¸i): (4)
In the next section, the variance and covariance in (2) and (4) will be shown
to be related to the rate of change over time of the aggregate hazard and the
aggregate expected accepted wage.
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4 The Aggregate Hazard and the Aggregate Expected
Accepted Wage
First, the aggregate hazard is shown to decline over time. Di®erentiating the










Since workers leave unemployment at rate q(¸i); the change in ni(t); denoted





¯ 0i(t) = ¯i(t) [q(t) ¡ q(¸i)] : (7)
Notice that equation (7) implies that if a group has a higher than average
hazard at time t; then its proportion in the population is declining at time t:




¯i(t) [q(¸i) ¡ q(t)] q(¸i): (8)
Notice that q0(t) is the negative of the expression in (2), which is the variance
of the hazard of workers who are unemployed at time t; thus, q0(t) is negative.












Using (7), (8), substitutingW (t)q(t) for
PK
i=1 ¯i(t)q(¸i)W (¸i); and some straight-
forward manipulation, yields







W (¸i) ¡W (t)
´
q(¸i):




The standard job search model predicts that the hazard from unemployment
and the expected accepted wage should be constant over an unemployment
spell. This prediction is at odds with the common empirical observation that
the hazard and average accepted wages decline with unemployment duration.
It has been shown in this note that a stationary job search model with work-
ers who di®er in the rate at which they receive job o®ers can generate both
declining hazards and declining accepted wages.
The model also yields two testable implications. First, an equivalence has
been obtained between the rate of change over time of the aggregate hazard
and the variance of the hazard. From this perspective, the variance of the
hazard in the standard search model is zero. Second, an equivalence between
the rate of change over time of the aggregate expected accepted wage and the
covariance of the aggregate hazard and the aggregate expected accepted wage
is demonstrated.
References
Borjas, G. and J. Heckman (1980) \Does Unemployment Cause Future Un-
employment? De¯nitions, Questions, and Answers from a Continuous Time
Model of Heterogeneity and State Dependence", Economica, 47, May, 247-283.
Burdett K. and T. Vishwanath (1988) \Declining Reservation Wages and
Learning Workers", Review of Economic Studies, 55(184), 655-665.
Devine, T.J. and N.M. Kiefer (1991) Empirical Labor Economics, Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Mortensen, D.T., 1986, Job Search and Labor Market Analysis, in: O.C.
Ashenfelter and R. Layard, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 2, (North-
Holland, Amsterdam) 849-919.
Rao Sahib, P. (1998) \O®er Heterogeneity in the Standard Search Model:
7
Implications for the Duration of Unemployment and Reemployment Wages"
Labour Economics, 5, 205-215.
Van den Berg, G. J. (1994) \The E®ects of Changes in the Job O®er Arrival
Rate on the Duration of Unemployment", Journal of Labor Economics, 12(3),
478-498.
8
